Blind Trusts as a Model for Campaign Finance Reform

Note from the Digital Editor: In order to highlight the high-level of research and scholarship from the authors who have published in the William & Mary Policy Review’s peer-reviewed print journal, we have reproduced the abstracts from Volume 4, Issue 1 along with a link to an electronic copy of the full form of the piece.

This paper explores the viability of blinds trusts as a means of reducing corruption in campaign finance. The prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption has bedeviled the United States government since the nation’s founding. The public frequently perceives government’s shortcomings as rooted in candidates’ ties to their donors. Blind trusts legitimize the campaign finance process from within, working in tandem with existing campaign finance restrictions. The voluntary use of blind trusts in campaign finance reform is a means to prevent both the real and perceived corruption commonly associated with campaign donations, while enabling candidates to fund their campaigns.

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Mr. Perry Pirsch is with the Berry Law Firm of Lincoln, Nebraska. He previously served as the Assistant Attorney General for the State of Nebraska.